Understanding the Remittance Gender Gap among Hispanics in the U.S.: Gendered Norms and Role of Expectations by Park, Yongjin et al.
Connecticut College 
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College 
Economics Faculty Publications Economics Department 
7-20-2016 
Understanding the Remittance Gender Gap among Hispanics in 
the U.S.: Gendered Norms and Role of Expectations 
Yongjin Park 
María Amparo Cruz-Saco 
Mónika López-Anuarbe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/econfacpub 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at Digital Commons @ 
Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact 
bpancier@conncoll.edu. 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. 
Understanding the Remittance Gender Gap among Hispanics in the U.S.: 
Gendered Norms and Role of Expectations 
Abstract 
Using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), this study analyzes the existence of a gender gap in favor of 
men in the monetary remittance behavior of Hispanics residing in the United States. Findings indicate that 
cultural gender norms and expectations in the country of origin play a key role. The study shows that 
women migrants are less likely to remit than men and, when they do, they transfer smaller amounts. The 
remittance gender gap is not universal among subgroups, since it is only observable among Hispanics 
who came to the US to improve their economic situation, plan to return to their home country, and have 
low income and low schooling. An index on migrants’ perceptions of gender roles as a proxy for cultural 
gendered norms is constructed and shows that more traditional gender views are associated with a 
significant gender gap in favor of men in remittances. 
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Remittances (income transfers from international migrants to their country of origin) represent 
an important source of foreign exchange and household income in Latin America (International Monetary 
Fund [IMF] 2009). They are predicted to reach US$73 billion in 2015,  and  are  mostly sent from migrants 
residing in the United States. In 2014, the   top three remittance receiving countries – Mexico, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador – received $24.9 billion, $5.8 billion, and $4.2 billion, respectively (World Bank 2013). A 
growing number of studies  (Sherri  Grasmuck  and Patricia R. Pessar 1991; Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994; Alejandro Portes 1997; Patricia Pessar and Sarah J. Mahler 2003; Carlota Ramírez, Mar García-
Domínguez, and Julia Míguez-Morais 2005; Nicola Piper 2009; Jørgen Carling 2008; Yunsun Huh 2016) 
underscore that migration patterns differ by gender, as do motivations affecting monetary and in- kind 
remittances. Elke Holst, Andrea Schäfer, and Mechthild Schrooten acknowledge that “Migration is not 
only an adaptive reaction to external economic conditions, but also the result of gendered interactions 
within networks of households, family, and friends” (2012: 203). This literature suggests that culturally 
determined gender norms affect migration and remittance decisions such as the purpose of out-
migration, the role a migrant plays in the domestic economy after migrating, and the type and amount of 
remittances. Yet to date, the relationship between gender norms and expectation and remittance 
behavior has not been explored in depth. In this paper, we use the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS 2006), 
a comprehensive national survey of Hispanics in the US,1 which includes approximately 10,000 
respondents, to construct an index on gender views and to empirically connect it to remitting behavior. 
                                                             
1 The US Census Bureau defines Hispanic or Latino as a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central 
American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. The LNS asks participants to self-identify as 
Hispanic or Latino/a or a person of Spanish origin. Participants who do not identify as either terminate the survey. 
Thus, for the purpose of the present study, we use “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably. Also, since the 
purpose of our paper is to study the remittance flow from the US to Central and South America, we excluded those 





We capture the effect of gender norms and show the existence of a gender gap favoring men in subgroups 
that display more traditional views on gender roles.2 We also segregate our sample by economic reasons 
to migrate, willingness to return to home countries, parental level of education, migrant education, and 
income level. We find that the non–US-born Hispanics who migrated for economic reasons, who plan to 
return home, who have a low educational level, whose parents’ education level is also low, and who earn 
a low income have the highest propensity to remit and remit the most. Those with the Those with the 
highest remittance propensity also display the most traditional gender views on gender division of labor, 
the labor market and leadership. Those with the highest remittance propensity also display the most 
traditional gender views on gender division of labor, the labor market, and leadership. 
 
2. DOES GENDER AFFECT REMITTANCE BEHAVIOR? 
Gender relationships within families and in the labor market affect family negotiations and 
decision making in the migration process (Monica Boyd and Elizabeth Grieco 2003). In Latin America, 
these relationships continuously evolve due to urbanization, demographic changes, women’s increased 
participation in the labor force, and migration (Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo 1999). They affect who 
migrates, why, how, how much to remit, and how often (International Organization for Migration [IOM] 
2011). Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) and Jennifer S. Hirsch (2003) show that gender, sexuality, and 
reproductive norms in sending communities differ from those in the US. For example, migrating to the 
US “has become firmly established as an option for women whose behavior does not conform to the 
community standards” while conservative Mexican men who migrate are wary of bringing their wives to 
the US because “en el Norte, la mujer manda [in the North, the woman gives the orders]” (Hirsch 2003: 
                                                             





180–208). Notwithstanding this “fear,” women are migrating on own for reasons other than family 
reunification, remitting more money to their relatives, or managing these international monetary 
transfers with greater autonomy (Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ernestine Avila 1997; Stephen Castles 
and Mark J. Miller 2009; Mustafa U. Karakaplan, George Naufal, and Carlos Vargas-Silva 2011; Manuel 
Orozco 2012; Kristin Göbel 2013). The complexities of gender roles and migration show that decisions to 
migrate and remittance behaviors are “gendered phenomena” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Katharine M. 
Donato, Donna Gabaccia, Jennifer Holdaway, Martin Manalansan, and Patricia R. Pessar 2006; Katharine 
M. Donato, Jonathan Hiskey, Jorge Durand, and Douglas S. Massey 2010) requiring 
interdisciplinary analysis to understand their dynamics (Sarah Mahler and Patricia R. Pessar 2006; Donato 
et al. 2006; Allison J. Petrozziello 2011). 
Economists have incorporated gender into research on international migration as a control 
variable (Lisa Pfeiffer, Susan Richter, Peri Fletcher, and J. Edward Taylor 2008). But attempts to include 
gendered relations have been limited to overly simplified analysis on the direction and magnitude of a 
remittance gender gap in favor of men, leading to mixed predictions on how gender affects remittance 
behavior. The use of sex (biological gender) to characterize gender identity may not always be 
appropriate, given the complexities surrounding gender identity itself. And even when survey 
respondents self-identify their gender, economic studies have not provided thorough explanations of the 
underlying reasons that motivate a gender gap. As shown in this paper, a measure of gender values and 
perceptions provides important insight into understanding the remittance gender gap in favor of men. 
Studies suggest that if migrant women have lower wages than men because they are concentrated in 
unskilled occupations or face discrimination in the labor market, then they would be expected to remit 





their families or to self-sacrifice despite lower wages, they may have a higher propensity to remit and 
remit a higher share of their income. Sarah A. Blue (2004) shows that migrant Cuban women remit 
relatively more than men even after being married, because they seem to care more about their relatives 
than men. Likewise, Keiko Osaki (1999) finds that migrant Thai women, mostly young and unmarried, have 
a higher propensity to support their families, and George Sami Naufal (2008) concludes that Nicaraguan 
women appear to remit larger amounts and to react more altruistically in response to an income shock in 
their household of origin, while men did not react to these income shocks. 
Other studies suggest  the  opposite:  migrant  men  are  more  likely  to remit and send greater 
amounts than women. Catalina Amuedo- Dorantes and Susan Pozo (2006) find that Mexican men were 
more likely to remit and had larger remittances. The United Nations International Research and Training 
Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN- INSTRAW 2007) suggests that 85 percent of Guatemalan 
migrants sent remittances, but only a quarter of these were women. And, in a study based on a National 
Survey of Latinos in 2002, Fernando Lozano-Ascencio (2005) finds that migrant men were more likely to 
remit. For studies of non- Hispanic migrants, Albert Bollard, David McKenzie, and Melanie Morten (2010) 
analyze over 12,000 Sub-Saharan and North African migrants     in nine OECD destination countries, and 
find that migrant men remit more, especially when spouses and children are left behind. Giulia Bettin, 
Riccardo Lucchetti, and Alberto Zazzaro (2009) shows that, for migrants in Australia, both self-interest 
and altruism matter, and that migrant men have a higher likelihood of remitting and remit more when 
they do so. 
There have been a few more nuanced approaches to the study of gender on remittances. In their 
seminal paper, Oded Stark and Robert E. B. Lucas (1988) propose a model of contractual arrangements 





family at home increases, remittances increase. For Botswana, girls were brought up with the expectation 
that they would pay their families back with subsequent remittances. This result supports an increase in 
the family’s bargaining power over migrant women – a pure contractual arrangement – as opposed to the 
argument that girls are more caring toward their parents than boys. Leah K. VanWey (2004) differentiates 
altruism from contractual models of exchange and shows that women and men can be equally altruistic 
and self-interested. Based on evidence from Thailand, she suggests that class can be a more defining 
characteristic   in shaping remitting behavior, and argues that a migrant from a poorer background remits 
more to her family. Manuel Orozco, B. Lindsay Lowell, and Johanna Schneider (2009) point out that Latina 
migrants may remit less than men but, when they do, they remit to distant family members and help raise 
families above the poverty line. Ramírez, García Domínguez, and Míguez-Morais (2005) find that women’s 
remittances may be less due to constraints in labor markets, but suggest that their nonmonetary 
contribution as family sustainers is overlooked in standard economic models. They emphasize the 
sustaining and caring functions of women in the family, which may be at the core of family reunification. 
In this paper, we move beyond mainstream economic formulations of the gender dimension in 
the remittance equation. We argue that gendered expectations, grounded in cultural norms and 
motivation to care for family, affect not only the migration decisions but also the remittance decisions of 
migrant men and women. We construct a “gender view index” that captures perceptions on gender roles 
at home, in the marketplace, and in the political sphere. This index allows us to estimate a gender 
remittance gap and to show that gender norms and gendered expectations are present in the monetary 
remittance behavior of Hispanics in the US. 





Three propositions allow us to formulate the route through which cultural gender norms and 
expectations may affect remittance decisions. 
First, we propose that US-born Hispanics may display different remittance behavior from non–
US-born migrants; gender norms of the former may be more strongly influenced by gender expectations 
in the US than non–US- born migrants. 
Second, assuming that migration costs are similar for women and men, gender differences in 
economic contributions to family may play a key role in setting up different remittance expectations for 
men and women. Therefore, for non–US-born migrants, we postulate that gender wage gaps in home 
country labor markets play a significant role in setting      up higher expectations for migrant men. While 
it has been pointed out that girls provide more nonfinancial services than their brothers, there are also 
mixed reports on whether the same level of service provision persists after marriage.3 Moreover, gender 
roles and cultural gender norms in home countries partly determine the desire and decision to migrate 
(Hein De Haas and Tineke Fokkema 2010; Karakaplan, Naufal, and Vargas- Silva 2011). Migrant men 
from more patriarchal societies where men    are assumed to be the primary breadwinners may migrate 
for a different purpose than women. 
Third, we propose that men from Latin America  are  more  likely  than women to migrate to the 
US for purely economic purposes, such as improving the economic conditions of themselves and their 
family members in their country of origin. Women tend to migrate for more diverse reasons, including 
family reunification and eldercare. Difference in the purpose of migration, in turn, may be related to the 
differences in the expected remittances from men and women at home. 
                                                             
3 Previous studies have shown that female migrants provide more in-kind remittances but, due to the difficulty in 





To operationalize them, LNS provide distinctive items that enable measurement of degree of 
patriarchy and gender norms, which traditionally privilege male activities, roles, and interests. Using these 
items, we construct a gender view index to quantify the degree of patriarchal gender views of migrants 
and propose that gender norms and expectations are associated with the degree to which migrant men 
remit more than migrant women. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION OF GENDER GAPS IN REMITTANCE BEHAVIOR 
(a) Data set and empirical strategy 
The LNS generated a random sample of Latino households that was drawn from a household 
database of approximately 11 million Hispanic households in the US, which covers approximately 87.5 
percent of th US Hispanic population.4 The survey consists of interviews containing approximately 165 
distinct items including demographics, political attitudes, and policy preferences. It also includes 
information on the migrants’ social and cultural views, reasons for coming to the U.S., and their plans to 
go back.  
Also, it is important to understand that Hispanics in the U.S. are a diverse population, including 
U.S.-born second- and third-generation Hispanics, Puerto Rican-born citizens, as well as foreign-born, 
citizen or noncitizen Hispanics. We should expect significant remitting behavior differences among these 
subgroups. As one of the largest data sets of self-identified Hispanic residents in the U.S., the LNS allows 
us to study the remittance behavior of these diverse subgroups. 
                                                             
4 Description of the data is found at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, LNS 2006 





Table 1 summarizes the respondents’ main descriptive characteristics and Table 2 provides more 
detailed information on categorical variables used in the estimations. 
Table 1 here 
To analyze remittance behavior, we examine two separate questions: Does a migrant send money 
at all? (Yes/No) and if the migrant sends money, how much does he/she send? (dollar amount).5 For the 
propensity to remit, we used a variable (TRMONEY), which asks “How often do you send money (to your 
home country)?” If the respondent answered “Never,” our remittance variable equals zero (one 
otherwise).  
For the remittance amount, we use a variable (TRMONAMT) which asks, “What is the average amount 
that you send (to your home country) each time?” One significant limitation of our amount variable is the 
way the variable is defined (amount sent each time), so it is not always possible to calculate the annual or 
monthly remittance flow.6 Therefore, we limit the sample to those who report regular payments—“once 
a month” (7 percent) and “once a year” (about 20 percent) — and calculate annual remittance payments. 
Omitting these irregular payment observations is unlikely to cause a biased results by gender because two 
out of three irregular payment categories—less than once a year, once every few months—virtually have 
equal representation of men and women (3.2 and 12.5 percent of women and 3.3 and 12.3 of men, 
                                                             
5 We have also tried ‘frequency’ based on how often a migrant sends money back to their home country (including 
not sending money at all and those who reported irregular payments) and got very similar results to the binary 
decision estimation. Please contact authors for the frequency estimation using ordered probit estimation. 
6 While the TRMONEY variable provides information on the frequency of remittances, there are four 
irregular/underspecified categories of TRMONEY, such as ‘more than once a month’ or ‘less than once a year.’ 
Since it is not clear whether ‘more than once a month’ means twice a month or twice or more in a month, it is not 





respectively); the third and most frequent category—more than once a month—has more men than 
women (12.34 and 6.76 percent, respectively). Therefore, we may have actually underestimated the 
remittance gender gap size instead of overestimated it. Those who reported irregular payment schedules 
are included in the binary model. 
Summary statistics in Table 1 show that, on average, women display a lower propensity to remit (49.9 
percent vs. 56.1 percent for males, t=5.23) and when they do, they send smaller amounts of money on 
annualized basis ($499 vs. $618, t=6.27). Among non U.S.-born Hispanics, the gender gap is more 
pronounced, both in terms of the probability of remitting (63.4 percent vs. 72.6 percent, t=6.75), and 
amount ($484 vs. $621, t=7.02). Also, U.S.-born Hispanics are far less likely to remit (24 percent) compared 
to foreign-born, non-citizen Hispanics, 74 percent of whom said that they send money to their home 
country. However, once they send money, there is little statistical difference in the amount. While these 
differences are interesting, they are only suggestive and we need to determine if these patterns persist 
after controlling for important covariates such as income. 
Table 2 here 
For a more rigorous analysis, we use four different sets of control variables. First, to capture the 
degree of assimilation, three variables—citizenship status, parents’ citizenship information, and number 
of years in the U.S.—are included. For demographic variables, we include gender—our key variable—age, 
age squared, marital status, education level, home ownership in the U.S., and the migrant’s state of 
residence in the U.S. Finally, to capture cultural background differences, the transaction costs of sending 
remittances, and the purchasing power of remittances, we add dummy variables for the country of origin. 
With respect to income, the LNS only provides a household income variable with seven pre-determined 
income categories: under $15,000, between $15,000 and $25,000, between $25,000 and $35,000, 





$65,000.7 Due to this limitation, it is not possible to calculate the share of income that migrants remit. In 
the next section, we discuss this limitation and our attempts to overcome it. 
For the binary estimation, we use a logit estimation and report the marginal effects of the covariates 
on the probability of remitting. For the estimation amount, we use the natural log value of the calculated 
annual amount and employ the Tobit method to account for the potential bias that occurs because a 
significant number of migrants reported zero remittances.8 In the tables that follow, we report marginal 
effects, conditional on the migrant sending money instead of Tobit coefficients. 
 
(b) Estimated Results 
(i) Baseline Findings on Remittances  
Our baseline findings, summarized in Table 3, show interesting gender differences in 
remittances. Estimates from the whole sample – including both U.S-born and non U.S.-born Hispanics –
show only weak evidence of a gender gap (men remitting more than women) in the likelihood to remit. 
However, as we predicted in the previous section, birthplace and citizenship status have a significant 
effect on remittances:  The estimates of citizenship status variables in the first column of Remittance 
Yes/No section show that foreign-born and non–US citizen Hispanics are more likely to remit, compared 
to US-born citizens, by 18 percent. Also, Hispanics who are naturalized citizens or non-citizens are less 
                                                             
7 It is common for immigration surveys to have broad categories for household income. This is due to two distinct 
factors: first, the incomes of migrants are often irregular and fluctuate greatly; second, survey participants often 
do not want to reveal their exact income. 
8 We also tried the Heckman two-step estimation for possible selection bias in remittances. Results are very similar 





likely to remit than U.S.-born citizens by about 10 and 18 percent, respectively, and the difference is 
statistically significant at 1 percent. The same pattern is observed in the amount of remittances. Foreign-
born citizens and foreign-born noncitizens send larger amounts that US-born citizens by 59 and 84 
percent respectively. 
Table 3 here 
When splitting the sample into US-born and non–US-born Hispanics to find possible structural 
differences in remittance behavior, it becomes clear that among non–US-born, noncitizen Hispanics, 
men are more likely to remit and they send larger amounts. The captured gender  gap  in favor of men is 
statistically significant at 1 percent for probability and  5 percent for amount. The gender gap in non–US-
born Hispanics is also economically meaningful: taken literally, Hispanic men are about 5 percent more 
likely to remit and, when they do, they send about 27 percent larger amounts. 
In the US-born Hispanic sample, however, the male dummy coefficient is negative and weakly 
significant in probability and insignificant in amount. This is a noteworthy phenomenon because, as 
mentioned in the pooled regression, non–US-born Hispanics are much more likely to remit than US-born 
Hispanics. The recurring pattern is that the gender gap in favor of men is prominent in subgroups that 
are more likely to remit, and disappears in the subgroups that are less likely to remit. 
Several variables such as having a child living in the country of origin (positive sign) and not 
currently living with their spouses (positive sign) have the expected signs and are statistically significant 
on remittance probability and amount. This is not surprising given that Hispanics who tend to display 
strong familism are caring for children left behind. Having children in the U.S. is negatively associated 
with both the likelihood and amount of remittances. Further, in accordance with the literature, length of 
stay in the U.S. shows clear negative and significant effects on both the probability and the amount of 





Household income has a relevant effect on remittance probability and amount. Compared to 
those whose household income is under $15,000, those living in households making a little more than this 
baseline (non-U.S-born Hispanics who make $15,000-$25,000) are about 5 percent more likely to remit 
and, on average, remit about 39 percent more. However, those who earn over $25,000 do not display any 
statistically significant difference in remittance behavior, and the top income group (over $65,000) is less 
likely to remit; even the amount is about 49 percent lower, conditional on the migrant sending money.9 
Two other estimates—education and homeownership—show a similar relationship between economic 
affluence and remittance behavior: Those who are better educated and homeowners (compared to 
renters) are less likely to remit, and the remittance amount tends to be smaller.10 This result suggests that 
social and economic conditions of the migrant may not tell the whole story of remittances. For example, 
those earning over $65,000 may have come to the U.S. from a very different background and from a family 
that does not need or demand remittances, compared to those who make less than $15,000.  
We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to examine how much of the remittance gender gap 
in the baseline regression can be explained by differences in observable characteristics between men and 
women. We run separate regressions for men and women and use the estimated regression coefficients 
to measure how much of the estimated difference between the two groups can be attributed to 
                                                             
9 This pattern does not change when we limit the sample to single-earner households to eliminate the difference 
between household income and personal income. 
10 Not all the economic variables display a negative effect on remittance. Employment status variables show that 
part-time employees or unemployed respondents are significantly less likely to remit. The key difference between 
employment status variables and other income-related variables, we believe, is that the employment status 





differences in characteristics such as income, and how much can be attributed to differences in estimated 
coefficients, a part that cannot be explained by the observed characteristics.11 Since our analysis requires 
non-linear decomposition because we use logit and Tobit models in the baseline regression, we follow the 
method proposed by Robert Fairlie (2005), Thomas Bauer and Mathias Sinning (2008).  
Table 4 summarizes the non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for the probability and 
the amount. The estimated probability differential is 9.6 percent, and the results based on the estimated 
coefficients for males show that observed characteristics differences only explain about 2.1 percent of the 
differential, less than one-quarter of the total differential. The remaining 7.5 percent points (more than 
three-quarters of the differential) are accounted for by coefficient differences. When coefficients for 
females are used, the unexplained portion decreases: About 5.6 percent points (more than half) of the 
difference is due to observed characteristics, and the remaining 4 percent points are due to the coefficient 
differences. Decomposing the amount remitted shows a similar pattern. Differences in characteristics 
account for 25.3 to 37.8 percent of the total estimated difference, depending on the coefficients used, 
while 63.7 to 76.1 percent of the estimated difference remains unexplained. This result confirms that the 
estimated gender gap in remittances cannot be explained by the differences in observable characteristics 
between men and women.  
Table 4 here 
                                                             
11 Since we are not interested in the individual contribution of any single explanatory variable on the gap, we 
focused on the total contribution of all the explanatory variables as a group to account for differences between 
females and males and decompose explained and unexplained components based on separate linear regressions 





Since there are 21 Latin American countries that differ in size, socio-economic context, and gender 
structure, one needs to be careful not to generalize migration or remitting behavior (Donato, Hiskey, 
Durand and Massey 2010). For example, Mexico has a relatively stronger patriarchal family structure 
and men tend to make migration decisions (Marcela Cerrutti and Douglas Massey 2001; Maria Aysa and 
Massey 2004; Mariano Sana and Massey 2005). In contrast, the Dominican Republic is relatively more 
matriarchal and women migrate both for economic reasons and for family reunification which are often 
related motives (Donato, Hiskey, Durand, and Massey 2010; Ninna Sørensen and David Garnizo 2007). 
Hence, we divide the sample into three subgroups of home countries for the non-U.S.-born Hispanics—
Mexico, Central America , the Caribbean, and South America—and run the regressions with the same 
regressor set from the baseline regression.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Results reported in Table 5 show that the remittance gender gap in favor of males is most 
pronounced among Mexican migrants and not significant otherwise. We cannot, however, conclude that 
the remittance gender gap is observed only among Mexican migrants since the other two subgroups 
(Central America and the Caribbean, and South America, respectively) are more heterogeneous with 
smaller sample sizes. Due to the significant presence of Mexican migrants in the U.S., also manifested in 
the LNS, our results are strongly affected by Mexican culture.  
 
(ii) Understanding the Gender Gap in favor of Males in Remittance Behavior 
Decomposition results show that a significant portion of the estimated gender gap cannot be 





part of the gender gap? Based on the reviewed literature, we hypothesize that differences in motives for 
migrating to the U.S., plans to return to the home country, and socio-economic-background may affect 
what the family of origin expects in terms of remittances. 
The baseline estimates in the previous section suggest that remittance behavior may depend on the 
migrant’s background and family gendered expectations. The LNS provides three variables with 
information on socio-economic background, migration purpose, and future plans: parents’ education 
level, the main reason a migrant came to live in the U.S., and plans to permanently return to the home 
country. Table 6 provides detailed information on these variables. 
Table 6 here 
While parents’ education did not show any discrepancy across gender, the other two variables 
did. More men (about 61 percent) report migrating to “improve economic situation” than women (50.4 
percent). Also, far more women (13.18 percent vs. 5.53 percent) cited “family reunification,” suggesting 
that men may come to the U.S. first, and that women rejoin. Finally, more women plan to stay in the 
U.S. (68.93 vs. 60.15 percent). If economic migrants and those who plan to return to their home country 
remit more, these differences in responses may explain the remittance gender gap.12  
When the three above-mentioned variables are added to the baseline non-U.S.-born Hispanic 
regressions, they affect remittance behavior and significantly reduce the gender remittance gap. Those 
who came to the U.S. for economic reasons are over 1.6 percent more likely to remit, and the amount 
                                                             
12 Before adding these variables in the regression, we simplified the migration purpose and the future plans 
variables as dummy variables based on economic and non-economic motives for the migration purpose, and future 






they send is about 79 percent larger than those of migrants who came for non-economic reasons. 
Similarly, those who plan to go back are about 11 percent more likely to remit, and the amount is about 
76 percent larger compared to those who do not plan to go back. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Susan 
Pozo (2006) show that migrants may send remittances to their family back home in exchange for 
preserving the migrant’s assets there, and to provide support in case the migratory experience proves 
unsuccessful. Our results confirm this “insurance motive”: Those who plan to go back are more likely to 
remit than those who do not. Parents’ education also has a significant negative effect on remittances: One 
level of improvement in parents’ education reduces the remittance probability by about 2 percent and 
the amount by about 16 percent. This is consistent with Douglas Massey and Lawrence Basem (1992), 
who find that Mexican migrants send less money when more land is owned by the family of origin.  
Table 7 here 
Moreover, the introduction of these two new variables reduces the estimated gender gap in favor 
of men, suggesting that the motive and future plan difference is at least a part of the reason for the gender 
gap in remittance: The male dummy coefficient decreased considerably, though the gap remained 
significant at 10 percent in both regressions.13 Therefore, it is clear that gender differences in migration 
motive and return plans explain at least a part of the overall gender gap in remittances. 
                                                             
13 This result is also confirmed by Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with the new variables. The additional variables 
considerably improve the share of remittance gender gap explained by characteristics (4-6.9 percent out of 9.5 
percent gap in probability and 0.32- 0.40 out of 0.948 gap in the amount). Detailed results are available from the 






However, there has to be a significant difference between economic migrants and non-economic 
migrants; those who plan to go back, and those who plan to stay; those from highly educated families and 
those from less educated families. What we found in Table 5 is that gender composition differences 
among these subgroups can explain a significant portion of the overall remittance gender gap. When 
examining the gender gap within each of these heterogeneous subgroups by splitting the sample based 
on migration motive or return plans, and allowing regression coefficients to differ, we reached even more 
interesting results: Table 5 suggests that the gender gap in favor of males is only observable among 
economic migrants, while the gap is non-existent among non-economic migrants. A similar pattern is 
observed for two other subgroup pairings: Highly educated parents/less educated and those who plan to 
return/those who don’t. Similar to the U.S.-born and non-U.S.-born Hispanics finding in the previous 
section, the gender gap was only observed in the subgroup that remitted more—economic migrants, 
those with less educated parents, and those who do not plan to return—while it disappeared in subgroups 
that were less likely to remit.  
Table 8 here 
Based on these findings, we hypothesize that the subgroup displaying a significant gender gap 
belongs to a low-income and low-education group. Estimates confirm our conjecture: Women in a low-
income (less than $35,000) and low-education (high school graduates or lower) subgroup are 6.8 to 7 
percent less likely to remit, and when they do send money, the amount tends to be 47 to 53 percent 
smaller. It seems that gender differences in migration motives, return plans, or parents’ education cannot 
provide an explanation for this outcome, since we are looking at the within-group gender gap of those 
who share the same characteristics in migration motives, return plans, or parents’ education. 
To summarize, our results suggest that the gender difference in migration motive and return plan 





a universal result across diverse Hispanic subgroups and can only be observed within specific subgroups: 
those with less educated parents, who migrate for economic reasons, and who plan to return. This is an 
important finding that points out the main driving force of the gender gap. Our subgroups may have 
different and distinct views on women’s roles from other subgroups, thus affecting the expected 
remittances of men and women. In our study, migrants in the high-remitting subgroups maintain more 
traditional views of gender norms. We therefore suggest that gender role differences, especially 
traditional views on female economic roles, may explain why these subgroups remit more. For example, 
when the gender stereotype of the male breadwinner is very strong, expectations of economic 
contributions from women might be relatively low, which confirms that migration and remittances are 
profoundly gendered. 
The LNS data provides three qualitative variables that may indirectly suggest a migrant’s view on 
gender roles. Relevant survey items ask the migrant to express opinions on the following statements: 
“Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs” (EQUALPAY); “Mothers should 
be more responsible for caring for their children than fathers” (CAREKIDS); and “Men are better qualified 
to be political leaders than women” (LEADERS) on a Likert scale: Strongly disagree 1, Somewhat disagree 
2, No opinion 3, Somewhat agree 4, and Strongly agree 5). Based on their responses, we construct the 
following index on gender views: 
  
Index = EQUALPAY + (6-CAREKIDS) + (6-LEADERS) 
 
The index accounts for traditional views on equal pay (the marketplace) and progressive 
perceptions on family care and leadership positions. To reflect gender perceptions in the same direction 





CAREKIDS and LEADERS variables from the number 6, to assign high points to progressive views from all 
three questions as the index value. For example, a migrant who strongly opposes equal pay (EQUALPAY 
=1) who strongly believes that women should be more responsible for child caregiving (CAREKIDS=5), and 
that men are better qualified to become leaders (LEADER=5) will have an index value of 3 = 1 + (6-5) + (6-
5)).14  
Using this index, we examine whether different subgroups in the previous section display 
significant differences in gender norms and if the pattern matches the pattern found in the remittance 
gender gap. Table 6 compares the average index value of each subgroup and includes t-statistics for 
statistical significance of the differences: The subgroup with a significant gender gap in remittances (non-
U.S.-born Hispanics, less educated parents, who came to the U.S. for economic reasons, plans to go back, 
has a lower education level, and a lower income level) shows relatively more traditional gender views 
(with highly significant t-value), compared to their counterparts (U.S.-born, highly educated parents, and 
who came to the U.S. for non-economic reasons).  
 
   Table 9 here 
 
Results suggest that specific gender norms from high-remittance migrants may explain why the 
remittance gender gap is only observed in certain subgroups: The specific gender norms of the high 
remittance group that our gender index captured should reflect the gender norms of the family of origin 
which, in turn, sets expected remittances for male and female migrants. If the likelihood and the 
amount of remittances reflects strong familism - ties that migrants have to their home family - and how 
                                                             






closely they keep the value systems they brought to the U.S., it is not surprising that migrants who are 
more likely to remit are also the ones who display gendered views of home families through their 
remittance behavior. Our findings also provide an explanation for our previous result: that the gender 
gap is not observed among U.S.-born Latinos or Hispanics. Unlike non-U.S.-born Hispanics, remittances 
of U.S.-born Hispanics are not driven by the expectations of the home family and are therefore unlikely 
to reflect the gender norms of the home country that generated the gender gap. It is also worth noting 
that the index effect on remittances itself can be ambiguous because its effect on men and women’s 
remittance behavior should be very different. Gendered expectations may be the cause of the 
remittance gender gap, but not the reason why Latino migrants send remittances. Our finding is 
consistent with VanWey (2004) and suggests that the remittance gender gap may not be driven by 
economic conditions of migrants in the U.S., as many researchers have assumed. Rather, the fact that 
the gender gap in favor of men is observable only in high-remitting subgroups may suggest that this 
gender gap is driven by differences in gender roles and remittance expectations. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Remittance decisions are based on complex gender and familial relationships embedded in 
specific institutional and cultural settings. We argue that family expectations in home countries are an 
important motivation for some Hispanic migrants whose families will continue to be supported by 
monetary remittances. We used the LNS (2006) data set to assess the likelihood and amount of 
remittances and to determine if there is a gender gap in favor of males in remitting behavior. We found 
that there is indeed a gender gap in favor of males not universally present across diverse subgroups of 
Hispanics. The gap is concentrated among non-U.S.-born and non-U.S. citizen Hispanics who came to the 





reflecting their low-income background in their home countries. A significant percentage of them plan to 
return. 
To further understand these findings, we constructed a gender gap index based on a set of items 
that captured gender views on gender division of labor, the labor market, and leadership. We found that 
subgroups with a higher likelihood and remitted amount display more traditional gender views. This result 
is not driven by migrants’ socio-economic conditions in the U.S. Instead expected remittances from 
families back home may ultimately reflect the gender norms in that country. 
We suggest that future studies on remittance behavior incorporate information on a migrant’s 
family background such as the income of the family in the home country to control for motivation and 
differences in gendered perspectives. In addition, it will be important to assess how changes in patriarchal 
structures and gender views will affect the remittance gap among the subgroup showing the highest 
remittance propensity and amount remitted. As Hirsch(2003) points out, research on migration focuses 
on cross-border connections and mutually constituted identities of transnational communities. For 
example, in the case of Hispanic women who have migrated to the U.S., some may adopt less traditional 
behavior and attitudes which may alter their gender identity as constructed back AT home. Moreover, 
sending and receiving communities are inevitably tied together and women who stay in (or returned to) 
the sending community share with their sisters in the U.S. a new ideal of family relations. As notions of 
gender and gender views evolve, of which high-skilled female migrants are an example, we should expect 
a change in the gender remittance gap. At the same time, a large part of the Hispanic migration to the 
U.S. continues to reflect, for the most part, economic motives that may sustain high remittance flows and 
lack of family reunification in the near future (Hirsch 2003). We look forward to witnessing which effect 
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Remit (0,1) 0.499 0.500 0.561 0.496 0.242 0.428 0.471 0.499 0.741 0.438 
# Adult in Household 2.453 1.116 2.665 1.287 2.391 1.119 2.429 1.133 2.726 1.271 
Age/10 3.871 1.224 3.763 1.246 3.773 1.312 4.300 1.243 3.535 1.071 
Age when came to US* 21.605 10.239 20.111 9.744   18.139 10.600 23.641 9.461 
Years in the US* 17.877 12.212 17.831 12.163   25.856 12.261 12.711 8.862 
Household Size 3.940 1.624 3.836 1.644 3.573 1.659 3.652 1.611 4.249 1.561 
Number of Own Children 2.196 1.571 1.842 1.692 1.804 1.623 2.191 1.670 2.071 1.608 





Education 3.635 1.907 3.719 1.926 4.645 1.496 3.935 1.897 2.908 1.839 
Parents born in US (0,1) 0.289 0.453 0.272 0.445 0.599 0.490 0.171 0.377 0.155 0.362 
Plan to Go Back (0,1) 0.339 0.605 0.404 0.615 0.146 0.424 0.289 0.571 0.555 0.671 
Observations 3865  3262  1935  1998  3150  
           
Remittance Amount  499.24 1648.73 618.68 1638.23 516.26 1645.18 740.40 2064.93 481.95 1424.70 
Observations 1051  898  217  493  1233  















 obs pct obs pct obs pct obs pct obs pct 
Household Income           
Below $15,000 684 21.38 375 13.26 130 7.69 216 12.47 707 28 
$15,000-24,999 770 24.07 581 20.55 234 13.85 307 17.73 803 31.25 
$25,000-34,999 553 17.29 520 18.39 240 14.2 317 18.3 511 19.88 
$35,000-44,999 385 12.04 375 13.26 243 14.38 260 15.01 252 9.81 
$45,000-54,999 232 7.25 281 9.94 201 11.89 184 10.62 124 4.82 
$55,000-64,999 195 6.1 168 5.94 158 9.35 130 7.51 74 2.88 
Above $65,000 380 11.88 527 18.64 484 28.64 318 18.36 99 3.85 
Employment Status           





Part-time worker 626 16.01 394 11.98 322 16.47 250 12.38 443 13.91 
Not in Labor Force 808 20.66 242 7.36 272 13.91 368 18.22 397 12.47 
Unemployed 477 12.2 131 3.98 126 6.45 153 7.57 326 10.24 
Marital Status           
Divorced 349 8.93 166 5.05 142 7.26 218 10.79 150 4.71 
Married 2,163 55.32 1,799 54.7 993 50.79 1,188 58.81 1,761 55.31 
Married Spouse Absent 190 4.86 147 4.47 63 3.22 95 4.7 177 5.56 
Not Married Living Together 261 6.68 194 5.9 89 4.55 75 3.71 291 9.14 
Single 859 21.97 953 28.98 646 33.04 387 19.16 768 24.12 
Widowed 88 2.25 30 0.91 22 1.13 57 2.82 37 1.16 
Home Ownership           
Other 112 2.86 85 2.58 42 2.5 34 1.9 61 2.33 
Own 1,948 49.82 1,630 49.56 1,124 67.02 1,084 60.59 928 35.42 





Ancestry           
Mexico 2,321 59.6 2,085 63.51 1,167 70.34 725 40.57 1,843 70.34 
Colombia 100 2.57 60 1.83 12 0.72 61 3.41 68 2.6 
Cuba 129 3.31 123 3.75 58 3.5 111 6.21 47 1.79 
Dominican Republic 263 6.75 130 3.96 43 2.59 146 8.17 144 5.5 
Don’t Know 16 0.41 8 0.24 13 0.78 7 0.39 2 0.08 
Ecuador 48 1.23 49 1.49 6 0.36 23 1.29 54 2.06 
Other South 72 1.85 48 1.46 6 0.36 42 2.35 54 2.06 
Peru 42 1.08 30 0.91 6 0.36 27 1.51 30 1.15 
Puerto Rico 578 14.84 376 11.45 309 18.63 453 25.35 3 0.11 
Central America 325 8.35 374 11.39 39 2.35 192 10.74 375 14.31 






Table 3. Baseline Regression Results 
 Remittance YES/NO Amount 
VARIABLES All US born Non US born All US born Non US born 
       
Male (0,1)  0.0282* -0.0375*  0.0503***  0.109 -0.237  0.273** 
 (0.0161) (0.0212) (0.0167) (0.079) (0.155) (0.107) 
Age/10  0.0605 -0.0739  0.185***  0.427* -0.566  1.323*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0609) (0.0475) (0.221) (0.421) (0.303) 
Age Squared/100 -0.0135** 0.00232 -0.0249*** -0.076***  0.046 -0.177*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0058) (0.028) (0.054) (0.0374) 
Ln(Years in the U.S.) -0.0775***  -0.0974*** -0.382***  -0.587*** 
 (0.0152)  (0.0146) (0.069)  (0.0858) 
Household Size  0.0307***  0.0170  0.0248*** -0.0048  0.110* -0.0605 





Adult in Household  0.0040  0.0177** -0.0048  0.118***  0.100  0.119** 
 (0.0064) (0.0086) (0.0066) (0.041) (0.085) (0.0541) 
Number of Children -0.0156  0.207* -0.0565 -0.539 -2.714 -0.529 
 (0.0684) (0.107) (0.0646) (0.356) (4.255) (0.429) 
Kid(s) Abroad (0,1)  0.213***   0.166***  0.777***   0.894*** 
 (0.0283)  (0.0222) (0.166)  (0.192) 
Education -0.0178*** -0.0171** -0.0118** -0.085*** -0.136** -0.0729** 
 (0.00484) (0.00778) (0.00479) (0.023) (0.0559) (0.0302) 
Household Income       
$15000~$25000  0.0457*  0.0121  0.0531**  0.304**  0.486  0.398*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0458) (0.0229) (0.122) (0.388) (0.152) 
$25000~$35000  0.0128 -0.0336  0.0280  0.159  0.369  0.212 
 (0.0268) (0.0413) (0.0255) (0.131) (0.383) (0.167) 





 (0.0299) (0.0497) (0.0296) (0.149) (0.416) (0.189) 
$45000~$55000 -0.00727  0.0147  0.0020 -0.0068  0.658 -0.0759 
 (0.0340) (0.0513) (0.0349) (0.168) (0.445) (0.224) 
$55000~$65000 -0.0619 -0.0355 -0.0469 -0.194  0.273 -0.227 
 (0.0390) (0.0474) (0.0434) (0.182) (0.431) (0.254) 
Over $65000 -0.108*** -0.0649 -0.0803** -0.481*** -0.0255 -0.494** 
 (0.0332) (0.0429) (0.0380) (0.150) (0.368) (0.209) 
Citizenship Status       
Puerto Rican Born -0.0539   -0.175  -1.189* 
 (0.0500)   (0.245)  (0.677) 
Foreign Born Citizen  0.109***   0.159 0.591***  -0.330*** 
 (0.0331)  (0.102) (0.188)  (0.125) 
Foreign Born Non Citizen  0.186***   0.242** 0.848***   





Parent Born in US -0.0842*** -0.130*** -0.0137 -0.293*** -0.461*** -0.0867 
 (0.0188) (0.0237) (0.0216) (0.0907) (0.168) (0.132) 
Housing       
Other Setting -0.0283 -0.0243 -0.0319 -0.187 -0.409 -0.143 
 (0.0506) (0.0597) (0.0539) (0.248) (0.470) (0.339) 
Rental  0.0470*** -0.0028  0.0523*** 0.256*** 0.148 0.340*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0249) (0.0187) (0.0898) (0.181) (0.119) 
Marital Status       
Divorced (0,1)  0.0672**  0.0272  0.0638** 0.154 -0.213 0.270 
 (0.0329) (0.0498) (0.0322) (0.176) (0.337) (0.241) 
Married (0,1)  0.0584***  0.0367  0.0506** 0.271*** 0.182 0.338** 
 (0.0215) (0.0275) (0.0231) (0.103) (0.201) (0.139) 
Married Spouse Apart   0.126***  0.197**  0.0791** 0.454** 0.767 0.423 





Not Married with Family   0.0782**  0.0963  0.0524 0.332* 0.751* 0.269 
 (0.0340) (0.0626) (0.0332) (0.179) (0.428) (0.229) 
Widowed (0,1)  0.0226  0.0282  0.0138 -0.0188 -0.180 -0.0429 
 (0.0638) (0.131) (0.0607) (0.324) (0.765) (0.414) 
Employment Status       
Part-time Worker (0,1) -0.0500**  0.0085 -0.0677*** -0.208** -0.102 -0.325** 
 (0.0226) (0.0292) (0.0248) (0.104) (0.206) (0.137) 
Not in the labor Force  -0.119*** -0.0612* -0.107*** -0.485*** -0.215 -0.650*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0319) (0.0268) (0.110) (0.246) (0.143) 
Unemployed (0,1) -0.137*** -0.0470 -0.137*** -0.657*** -0.525* -0.848*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0374) (0.0321) (0.121) (0.290) (0.155) 
       
Observations 6,099 1,726 4,373 4,385 1,487 2,898 
Pseudo R2 0.221 0.144 0.158 0.101 0.0740 0.0694 





Table 4. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Remittance Gender Gap (Non-U.S.-born Latinos) 
 Remittance Yes/No Remittance Amount 
Results Coeff. Percentage Coeff. Percentage 
Omega =1 (when men’s coefficients are used) 
Characteristics 0.0208 21.76% 0.2534 24.97% 
Coefficients 0.0747 78.24% 0.7613 75.03% 
Omega=0 (when women’s coefficients are used) 
Characteristics 0.0556 58.20% 0.3778 37.23% 
Coefficients 0.0399 41.80% 0.6370 62.77% 







Table 5. Remittance Gender Gap (Non-U.S-born Latinos) among subgroups  
VARIABLES Mexico Central America South America 
Remittance Probability 
   
Male (0,1)  0.0687***  0.0344  0.0308 
 
(0.0227) (0.0293) (0.0741) 
Observation 2,347 1,029 353 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.199 0.191 
    
Remittance Amount 
   
Male (0,1)  1.033***  0.712 -0.415 
 
(0.379) (0.452) (1.010) 
Observation 1,586 678 251 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.081 0.089 






Table 6. Gender Difference in Migration Reasons and Return Plans 
 Female Male 
Reason for coming to the U.S.  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Improve economic situation 1,201 50.4 1,256 60.91 
My parents brought me as a child 426 17.88 295 14.31 
Family reunification 314 13.18 114 5.53 
Education 163 6.84 124 6.01 
Escape political turmoil 84 3.52 130 6.3 
Other 195 8.18 143 6.94 
Total 2,383 100 2,062 100 
     
Plans to Return Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Don't Know 161 7.06 147 7.31 
No 1,573 68.93 1,209 60.15 
Yes 541 23.71 648 32.24 
Total 2,275 100 2,004 100 
     
Parents Education     
Don’t Know 110 4.64 138 6.62 





One (both) of Them Finish High School 480 20.26 432 20.73 
One (both) of Them Attended College 112 4.73 87 4.17 
One (both) of Them Got College Degree 119 5.02 110 5.28 
One (both) of Them Got Advanced Degree 89 3.76 78 3.74 







Table 7. Estimates and Decomposition when migration reasons and return plans are added 
VARIABLES Remittance Yes/No Remittance Amount 
   
Male (0,1)  0.0313*  0.196* 
 (0.0169) (0.105) 
Immigration Plan    
US for Economic Reason  0.146***  0.790*** 
 (0.0171) (0.107) 
Plan to Go Back  0.113***  0.760*** 
 (0.0177) (0.125) 
   
Observations 4,373 2,898 
Pseudo R2 0.178 0.0780 







Table 8. Remittance Gender Gap in Various Subgroups for Non-U.S.-Born Hispanics 
 Economic Reason Non-Economic Reasons 
 Yes/No Amount Yes/No Amount 
Gender Gap  0.0577***  0.565*** -0.0044 -0.0554 
 (0.0189) (0.177) (0.0282) (0.170) 
Observations 2,378 1,336 1,877 1,110 
Pseudo R2  0.155 0.0513 0.144 0.0725 
 Plan to Go Back Do not plan to go back 
 Yes/No Amount Yes/No Amount 
Gender Gap  0.0695***  0.808***  0.0214  0.193 
 (0.0242) (0.271) (0.0216) (0.137) 
Observations 1,181 623 3,076 1,823 
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.0632 0.162 0.0607 
 Less Educated Parents Educated Parents  
 Yes/No Amount Yes/No Amount 
Gender Gap  0.0416**  0.353**  0.0409  0.222 
 (0.0206) (0.152) (0.0309) (0.199) 
Observations 2,802 1,607 1,456 839 





 Low Income (<$35,000) High Income (>$35,000) 
 Yes/No Amount Yes/No Amount 
Gender Gap  0.0704***  0.531***  0.0351  0.180 
 (0.0200) (0.160) (0.0299) (0.200) 
Observations 2,830 1,621 1,428 825 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.0556 0.0971 0.0526 
 High School or lower Some College or higher 
 Yes/No Amount Yes/No Amount 
Gender Gap  0.0686***  0.477***  0.0383  0.182 
 (0.0194) (0.154) (0.0328) (0.199) 
Observations 2,973 1,705 1,283 741 
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.0528 0.138 0.0745 
All other regressors remain the same as those in baseline regressions. 
Estimated coefficients for all the other regressors are available in the supplemental, 
online appendix. 







Table 9. Gender Norm Index 
Gender Norm Index Obs Mean Std. Dev. t-statistic 
Birth Place     
Non-US-born  4218  11.597     2.829  
US-born  1647 12.568   2.578 -12.21 
Why Come to US     
Economic Reasons 2347 11.336 2.838  
Non-Economic Reasons 1871 11.926 2.783 -6.780 
Plans to Go Back     
YES 1168 11.201 2.901  
NO 3050 11.749 2.786 -5.549 
Parents’ Education     
High School or less 2798 11.383 2.863  
More than High School 1462 12.007 2.698 -7.017 
Education     
High School or Less 2973 11.173 2.857  
More than High School 1283 12.562 2.510 -15.849 
Household Income     
Less than $35000 2830 11.288 2.821  
More than $35000 1428 12.206 2.744 -10.177 
 
